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Strategic partnerships have, in fact, become a key foreign policy instrument in a multi-
polar world and are increasingly perceived as both a process and a format in which to 
conduct foreign relations with major players. A variety of adjectives have been used to 
describe the India-EU strategic partnership since its establishment in 2004. This paper 
first discusses the nature of the concept of strategic partnership, and examines European 
and Indian perceptions of this concept. It then evaluates the key challenges confronting 
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1. Introduction
A variety of adjectives have been used to describe the India-EU strategic partnership. 
Some call it an honorary degree or reward conferred by the Union on emerging powers 
as recognition of their growing regional and international profile. Others call it a political 
declaration of intent, more process than substance, or great showpieces of EU foreign 
policy – nice ornaments, but badly implemented. Some dismiss it as a “charade” without 
any strategic content (Jaffrelot 2006) or “a loveless marriage” (Khandekar 2011: 3).
This paper discusses the nature of the concept of strategic partnership and examines 
European and Indian perceptions of this concept. It evaluates the key challenges 
confronting the decade-long India-EU strategic partnership and makes a number of 
concluding observations. 
2.	 Defining	a	“Strategic	Partnership”
The term “strategic partnership” entered the international relations lexicon in the late 
1990s. It has been a major tool of post-Cold War international relations, which “enhances 
or justifies a close relationship between two states that seek mutual gains but whose 
interests may be competitive rather than shared” (Kay 2000: 15). Strategic partnerships 
have, in fact, become a key foreign policy instrument in a multipolar world and are 
increasingly perceived as both a process and a format in which to conduct foreign 
relations with major players. They signify a more intense engagement at higher levels 
than the normal intercourse between two entities. Each one has a specific character and 
is structured around a series of dialogues on areas of mutual interest and possibilities 
for fruitful engagement. They involve “forging links between countries that are neither 
allies nor adversaries, but which share a range of both common and divergent interests” 
(Nandkarni 2011: 48-49). The term “strategic” is said to refer more to “the absence of 
divisive issues than to a joint strategy in the traditional sense” (Godement 2006: 63). 
Strategic partnerships are “a strategy of cooperating while competing” (Ness 2012: 3). 
They comprise several common elements:
 “(1) they are formalized in multiple written declarations, statements, agreements, and 
 memoranda of understandings that outline clear policy objectives and attempt to 
 build upon and deepen multifaceted ties; (2) they create formal institutional links at  
 various governmental and non-governmental levels, generating multiple interactive  
	 channels	at	the	levels	of	Track	I	(official)	and	Track	II	(people-to-people)	diplomacy;	(3)	 
 they set up a mechanism for summit meetings . . . with more frequent meetings at the 
	 sub-ministerial	 and	bureaucratic	 levels	where	 officials	 explore	 common	 interests	 or 
	 concerns,	often	in	joint	task	forces	established	to	address	specific	issues;	.	.	.	(5)	seek 
	 to	establish	a	stronger	economic	relationship;	and	finally,	(6)	they	attempt	to	foster 
 greater awareness of each other’s culture. . .” (Nandkarni 2011: 48-49).
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3. Evolution of the Strategic Partnership
The journey from a “non-associable”1 in the early 1960s to a strategic partner of the 
European Union took more than four decades. For the first time, the Joint Declaration of 
the inaugural India–EU summit (June 2000) spoke of the resolve to build “a new strategic 
partnership” in the twenty-first century founded on shared values and aspirations. To 
that end, it specified a 22-point Agenda for Action listing areas in which to “enhance” 
cooperation and build “a coalition of interests” to meet the challenges of the twenty-
first century. The first summit was said to have marked the “beginning of a process” of 
building a strategic partnership (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2001: 61) and the Joint 
Declaration had laid out its “framework” (India-EU Second Summit, Joint Communique, 
23 November 2001, para 4).
The European Security Strategy (ESS) (December 2003) was the first EU document to 
mention strategic partnerships as a kind of foreign policy tool. It urged the EU to “look 
to develop strategic partnerships” with Japan, China, Canada, and India, as well as 
with “all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support” 
(European Council 2003: 14). Each of these partners mentioned in the ESS were “key 
international players” with which a partnership would develop “in different ways”. 
(Solana 2004) However, the ESS did not provide any guidelines or list the shared goals 
and priorities for strategic partnerships. 
After working for over a year, the European Commission came out with a communication 
on “An EU-India Strategic Partnership” (June 2004), which proposed a series of “strategic 
policy dialogues” and “strategic sectoral dialogues” (European Commission 2004: 6) 
to streamline the architecture of the relationship. It proposed to develop a “genuinely” 
strategic partnership with India in four key areas: a) cooperation, especially in multilateral 
fora, on conflict prevention, the fight against terrorism, and non-proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction; b) a strengthened economic partnership through strategic policy 
and strategic dialogues; c) development cooperation; and d) fostering intellectual and 
cultural exchanges. The objective, the attached 46-page Commission Services Working 
Document added, was to have “a firm and visible upgrading” of the relationship from 
the existing dialogue between “good friends to a truly strategic partnership between 
two major international players” (European Commission 2004: 45). Six weeks later, in 
a detailed 31-page Response to the EC Communication – the first ever Indian strategy 
paper on relations with an outside entity – New Delhi presented a number of proposals 
for enhancing more systematic interaction with the European Union (India, Ministry of 
External Affairs 2004).
The strategic partnership was endorsed at the fifth India–EU summit (2004). Two texts were 
negotiated: a new Political Declaration and a Joint Action Plan (European Commission 
2005) divided into four sections (politics, trade and investment, economic policy, and 
cultural and academic matters) covering issues of mutual concern were adopted at the 
1 The EEC-6 were unwilling to offer association in any form to a large developing country like India with 
British colonial ties because of the existence of low-wage manufacturing industries and trade,  
predominantly manufacturing and semi-manufacturing. The Six therefore proposed to adopt a “decala-
ge” in applying the common external tariff so that the export outlets of these countries might be develo-
ped while safeguarding Community interests (European Economic Community, Commission 1963: 220).
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next summit in September 2005. The Joint Political Declaration was deemed to be the 
“starting point” of a joint reflection that would lead to “a firm and visible upgrading” of 
the EU-India relationship, from the existing dialogue between “good friends” to “a truly 
strategic partnership” between two major players (European Commission 2004a: 15). 
An Implementation Report (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2006) on the working of the 
strategic partnership was presented at the Helsinki summit (October 2006), where it was 
agreed that an annual progress report on implementation of the JAP would be presented. 
The eighth summit (November 2007) resolved to make an “overall assessment” of the JAP 
in 2008 and assess the “ways and means” to further upgrade the overall framework of EU-
India relations (India-EU Joint Statement, 30 November 2007, para 3). At the Marseilles 
summit (September 2008), a revised JAP was adopted, which added 40-odd new activities 
in four areas (peace and comprehensive security, sustainable development, research and 
technology, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges). The Joint Action Plans read 
more like a laundry list which were “long on shared fundamentals and abstract political 
objectives but short on specifics and deliverables, and devoid of timelines” (Muenchow-
Pohl 2012: 13). They lead “mainly to dialogue, commitments to further dialogue, and 
exploratory committees and working groups rather than to significant policy measures 
or economic breakthroughs” (Malone 2012: 229).
4. European Perceptions
The European Union’s strategic partnership with India is one of the ten2 it has worldwide 
and one of four in Asia. The concept of strategic partnership is apparently rooted in 
the broader narrative of the EU as a strategic actor. Apart from occasional discursive 
references to the concept of strategic partnership, there is no well-defined narrative 
around them. One EU diplomat even described it as “like love – no one can define it. You 
can only know what it is when you experience it” (cited in Rettman 2010).
There is no clear-cut definition of a strategic partnership so far in any EU document. At a 
special Council meeting organized by President of the European Council Van Rompuy to 
discuss strategic partnerships, they were said to provide “a useful instrument for pursuing 
European objectives and interests. . . the full participation of emerging economies in the 
international system should allow its benefits to be spread in a balanced manner and its 
responsibilities to be shared evenly” (European Council 2010: 3). It signifies “a balance of 
mutual advantages and commitments” (Rompuy 2010). Trade is “a cornerstone” of the 
strategic partnership (Ashton 2010). Enhancing trade constitutes “a crucial objective” of 
a strategic partnership “contributing to economic recovery and job creation”. To that end, 
the EU must “take concrete steps to secure ambitious Free Trade Agreements, secure 
greater market access for European businesses and deepen regulatory cooperation with 
major trade partners” (European Council 2010: 3).
Recent years have witnessed a growing body of literature and a growing debate amongst 
European scholars on the nature, motivations, objectives and the convergence/divergence 
 
2 Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States. 
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of the Union’s strategic partnerships. The motivations of the EU’s strategic partnerships 
are said to include the need (a) to address the emergence of new powers; (b) provide an 
alternative for reinvigorating diplomacy in which bilateral approaches seem to dominate 
international relations; and (c) an attempt to assert the growing importance of the EU 
over the national diplomacies of the Member States (Renard and Biscop 2012: 196-197). 
They are “a necessary (sub-)strategy for the EU to cope successfully with the changing 
global order and to avoid global irrelevance” and “a blueprint for a smart use of the EU’s 
(and therefore Europe’s) power” (Renard 2011: 6).
The objectives of strategic partnerships include managing world multipolarity for 
the spread and promotion of international norms and multilateralism (Grevi and De 
Vanconcelos 2008), an attempt to strengthen its new image as a power adapting to 
multipolarity (Gratius 2011: 4), and adapting EU trade policy to the economic emergence 
of its partners.
The EU’s strategic partnerships are increasingly perceived as static and disappointing. 
They are not considered to be truly strategic because not every partner is equally strategic, 
the Union does not cooperate with its partners on most truly strategic issues, it has no 
structural or institutional impact on the relationship, and most partners do not regard 
the EU as a strategic partner at all, in many cases (Renard 2011: iv). This led Herman van 
Rompuy to acknowledge at the first-ever meeting of the Council (16 September 2010) 
to discuss strategic partnerships that “new players do not always share our interests and 
worldviews”. He added: “We have strategic partners, now we need a strategy” (European 
Council 2010: 2). The European Council agreed on the need for Europe “to promote its 
interests and values more assertively and in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit” 
(European Council 2010: 2). The consensus that emerged at the September meeting 
was that Europe was still punching below its weight and that it was only when acting 
together that the EU could hope to itself become a strategic partner (Renard 2011: 14). 
While Catherine Ashton presented reports on the strategic partnerships with the United 
States, China and Russia in December 2010, a report on the one with India is still awaited.
5. Indian Perceptions
India’s strategic partnership with the European Union is one of the nearly 25 India has 
worldwide, including with three key EU Member States – France (since 1998), Germany 
(since 2000) and the United Kingdom (since 2004). However, amongst all its strategic 
partnerships, the EU remains the only entity with which formal documents in the form 
of Joint Action Plans have been drawn up. 
Strategic partnerships, according to the Indian Government, enable an expansion of 
“policy choices and developmental options” (India, Ministry of External Affairs 2006a: ii) 
and assume “understanding and openness on both sides” (Nath 2005). They represent 
an upgrade, “a qualitative transformation” of mutual interaction (Singh 2004a), and a 
“maturing” of the relationship (Tripathi 2005).
There are, according to India, four key elements of the India-EU strategic partnership. 
Firstly, like the EU, the primary objective is economic: to increase trade and investment 
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potential, to seek greater access for Indian products into the European market, and to 
contribute to Indian growth and development. Secondly, in an age of multi-alignment 
and simultaneous engagement of all major powers, it enhances strategic autonomy. 
Thirdly, it is based on sovereign equality and on “comparative advantage and a mutuality 
of interests and benefits” (Indian Response to the EC Communication 2004: 4, para 2). 
Fourthly, it was not envisaged as “a partnership where one side is prescriptive or one side is 
intrusive and the other side is, in a sense, a passive partner” (India, Ministry of External 
Affairs 2004: 6, para 7, emphasis added).
A leading Indian think-tank regards a strategic partnership to be “a long-term interaction 
between two countries based on political, economic, social and historical factors”. (Azad 
and Gupta 2011) For another think-tank, it is “a new pattern of international relationships 
in which nations enter into freewheeling partnerships with other nations based on 
complementarity of interests in specific but vital areas. . . . [they] do not bind nations 
to support each other on all strategic issues in all situations” (Foundation for National 
Security Research 2011: 1). Each partnership has a specific character and focuses on 
certain “core areas” of national interest3 (Foundation for National Security Research 2011: 
1). Interestingly, both the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses4 and the Foundation 
for National Security Policy considered it a misnomer to regard the India-EU partnership 
as “strategic” because of the lack of a security or defence dimension.
6. A Decade of Strategic Partnership: Key Challenges 
The India-EU strategic partnership has facilitated the widening and deepening of 
dialogue beyond trade and commerce. Engagement has enabled both to sensitize one 
another with each other’s expectations and perspectives. However, despite a decade-long 
strategic partnership, both have not been able to transform shared values into shared 
interests and shared priorities due to a big disconnect in world-views, mindsets and 
practical agendas, because the two are at different levels of socio-economic development, 
come from two different geo-political milieus and have different geographical and 
geopolitical priorities. The lack of deliverables is not something unique to the India-
EU strategic partnership, but is typical of the Union’s strategic partnerships with the 
emerging powers, most of which have a problem of substance. Both India and the 
European Union, as Pallavi Aiyar elaborates, have complex decision-making processes:
 “Protectionist trade unions, a coalition of 28 member-states with divergent  
 priorities, and a convoluted internal decision-making process do not make for 
3 These areas were defined as including the supply of defence equipment and technology, military exer-
cises, cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, trade and investments, diplomatic support on critical 
issues, cooperation in science and technology, education, agriculture, information and communication 
technology, banking, insurance, etc.
4 The Foundation for National Security Policy examined India’s relationship with the United States, Rus-
sia, Japan, UK and China, on the basis of five parameters, viz. economics, politics, defence, technology 
and people-to-people, and rank them in order of importance. The EU also did not figure in the six coun-
tries (United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan) that the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses identified for its study on the basis of those which were most active in the fields of 
defence cooperation, economic cooperation and political-diplomatic cooperation.
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 quick results. In this regard, India is Europe’s doppelganger. Cumbersome  
	 coalitions,	 powerful	 civil	 society	 organizations	 and	 conflicting	 interests	 amongst	 
 political constituencies are also a hallmark of the decision-making process in 
	 New	 Delhi.	 But	 European	 officials	 rarely	 acknowledge	 these	 parallels,	 choosing 
 instead to . . . disparage India for faults the EU itself can be charged with” (Aiyar 
 2009).
The proliferation of consultation mechanisms – an annual summit, Foreign Minister 
ministerial level dialogue, and 27 sectoral dialogues – has perhaps given rise to dialogue 
fatigue. Some forums like the India-EU Roundtable have not been renewed (after 2008) 
while new dialogue formats like the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) (see Jain 2013) have 
emerged. The annual business summit held back-to-back with the political summit has 
been downgraded to a “business roundtable” at the 2012 summit in Delhi, as it attracted 
fewer and fewer heavyweights. The two sides therefore need to focus on a smaller 
number of longer-term strategic priorities than cluttering the agenda, but this is not 
always easy as many dialogues seem to take on an inherent institutional life of their own. 
Global Governance
Emerging powers like India argue that the structures of global governance must be more 
democratic, representative and legitimate to reflect current geopolitical and economic 
realities. In recent years, while there has been a gradual, but limited, democratization 
of the global economic architecture, the political and security architecture remains 
virtually frozen in time. The EU has been unable to formulate a common position on the 
enlargement of the UN Security Council due to internal differences. 
As an emerging power, India has, in fact, had to navigate “four chaotic transitions” in 
global governance: (a) the transition from rule-takers to rule-makers; (b) the transition 
from framing rules to developing new sets of global arrangements in which ‘regime 
design’ figures prominently; (c) from single regimes to recognizing ‘regime complexes’ 
or the multiplicity of institutions with overlapping but often incoherent rules in each 
area (climate change, trade, energy, etc.); and (d) the transition from formal institutions 
towards informal networks, where small groups of states or even non-state actors are 
framing the rules that would govern emerging issues like cyber security, outer space, etc. 
(Council on Energy, Environment and Water 2012: 6-7).
Emerging powers, according to former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, are “premature 
powers” because they continue to classify themselves as developing countries owing to 
per capita income level and the continuing incidence of poverty and illiteracy. This leads 
to considerable ambivalence, since they need “to contribute to global public goods but 
they also feel entitled to non-reciprocal benefits from global regimes to help deal with 
their still considerable developmental challenges” (Saran, 2012: 8). While Europe does 
acknowledge the need to restructure international institutions and give more voice and 
seats to emerging powers, it perceives their role “more” in terms of co-opting them 
in a largely Western dominated system, ensuring that they played by the rules already 
established by the dominant players. If the global economic architecture was undergoing 
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change in response to the transformation of the global economy, the change was still 
driven by the Western, industrialized economies with little by way of agenda setting by 
the emerging economies. “The existing architecture was sought to be retained even 
while accommodating new players. More tenants occupied the building, but the landlord, 
who set the house rules, remained the same” (Saran, 2012: 25-26, emphasis added).
As an aspiring power, India has been more sympathetic to the American effort to “rework” 
the rules of the global game (e.g. the Indo-US nuclear deal), whereas Europe is perceived 
as “a conservative force: protectionist, in relation to markets, but also much else, hoping 
to keep what it has” (Khilnani 2006: 490-491). Europe is clearly over-represented in 
various international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the G-20 and is in no hurry to end its over-representation. It is not ready to 
part with the disproportional representation and influence this order affords vis-à-vis the 
emerging powers. Europe has, in fact, become “a main obstacle” to reform (Muenchow-
Pohl 2012: 31). Whatever increase in representation of the emerging powers will take 
place in international institutions will usually be at the expense of the Europeans. For 
example, within the International Monetary Fund, the United States effectively vetoed 
the renewal of the Executive Board’s seats in August 2010 and thereby pushed European 
countries to accept a reduction from eight to six seats on the Executive Board, with the 
surrendered seats going to emerging countries. 
Instead of being a revisionist power, India has been more than willing to integrate into 
existing structures. India’s objective is to enhance its influence and representation in 
the existing international institutional architecture. It does not seek “to destroy or even 
replace existing international governance institutions with alternative new institutions; 
it is merely knocking on the door to gain entry or have a bigger say or protect its 
interests” (Singh, Mehta and Jones 2013: 9). New Delhi has, in fact, consistently urged 
the preservation and reform of existing institutions and argued that its inclusion in them 
would prove beneficial. The Indian strategy in global governance today is to intensively 
engage leading players and forge issue-based coalitions with like-minded countries. 
Europe needs to recognize that since the end of the Cold War, India has become more 
pragmatic and less assertive; it feels it deserves a seat at the high table and should be 
part of the global management system. 
Effective	Multilateralism
Both India and the European Union agreed to “work closely” to promote effective 
multilateralism (Joint Action Plan 2005: 3-4), which has been described primarily as 
“a form of governance that should produce noticeable effects whilst being embedded 
within strong, negotiated, and enforceable multilateral regimes” (Wouters, Jong and 
Man 2010: 15). The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy confirmed that strategic partnerships were an integral way for the EU to 
achieve the stated objective of effective multilateralism, saying “the ESS called for 
Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 
2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective” (European 
Council 2008). Strategic partnerships have not proven to be appropriate instruments 
to promote effective multilateralism, since partners have different perceptions and 
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expectations largely because of different historical legacies and foreign policy traditions. 
Most European analysts argue that emerging powers like India tend to take “a rather 
instrumental approach” to international cooperation and generally regard multilateral 
bodies to be useful in so far as they “amplify their respective national positions, constrain 
or inhibit unwelcome initiatives and uphold the traditional principle of non-interference 
in internal affairs” (Grevi 2012: 16; Wagner 2008: 90; de Vasconcelos 2008: 10). Most of 
the EU’s strategic partners are said to have a preference for “functional and/or revisionist 
multilateralism” (Gratius 2011a: 7). 
India does not take the EU’s rhetoric on multilateralism and global goods at its face value. 
The utility and goal of effective multilateralism should be meaningful and achievable. 
Brussels is motivated by the desire to claim superiority over its partners and very often 
it tends to become so important that achievable goals are put aside. For New Delhi, 
effective multilateralism signifies the delivery of “equitable and universally applicable 
accords” (Abhyankar 2009: 404). It criticizes the tendency of Europeans to ascribe nobler 
intentions and objectives to themselves in establishing stringent, enforceable regimes 
as if they were not motivated and reflected European national interests. Morality and 
universal causes are essentially instruments of state; they are espoused “primarily to 
advance the national interest and, only secondarily, some collective good” (Karnad 
2006: 494). Thus, while some strategic partners use the same words like “effective 
multilateralism”, they often mean different things (cf. Stumbaum 2007).
Since the end of the Cold War, India has increasingly adopted a more pragmatic approach 
towards multilateralism and shed its moralpolitik. It has been steadily expanding its 
linkages and interaction with multilateral institutions and regional groupings in Asia 
(see Jain 2011). It has cooperated in the establishment of new regional organizations 
and has contributed to the establishment of alternative structures of emerging powers 
like IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa). India’s membership and engagement in these multilateral arrangements does 
involve some sovereignty trade-offs, but “the underlying vision is that any sovereign 
trade-offs are more than compensated for by the real power that accrues from these 
institutions” (Waheguru, Mehta and Jones 2013: 18). India has welcomed the significant 
political and military role that Europe has played in dealing with complex issues like 
piracy off the Somali coast and progress on the Iran nuclear issue. However, “unilateral 
(sometimes covert) interventions as in Libya or Syria have led to unexpected and 
dangerous outcomes. We clearly need to improve, strengthen and use the processes 
and institutions of multilateral consultation and action available to the international 
community” (Menon 2014).
The EU has urged India to be a “responsible power” (See Ferroro-Waldner 2008) and to 
do more, especially in international security. For one leading Indian analyst, since the 
2000s, India has pursued “responsible multilateralism”, which has essentially involved 
the erosion of Third Worldism in India’s approach towards multilateralism (Raja Mohan 
2013: 35). To the West, National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon pointed out that 
being a “responsible” power means “they want us to do what they wish”. India’s “primary 
responsibility”, he added, “is and will remain improving the lives of its own people for 
the foreseeable future. In other words, India would only be a responsible power if our 
choices bettered the lot of our people” (Menon 2011).
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Normative Disconnect 
A key objective of the EU’s strategic partnerships is to promote and extend social, 
economic and ideological norms that have been successful in Europe at the global 
level as global public goods. The EU engages in the practice of “othering” wherein 
it represents the other as “different” and inferior, as an entity not yet able to achieve 
universal principles. As a result, it needs to show others how things are done (Diez 
2005: 628-629). The Europeans have come to believe that their transcendence of power 
holds lessons for others, that they have “a civilizing mission”, and that the European 
experience is the standard of the world which others must adopt or adapt in the manner 
they are proposed. Europe often presents the normative agenda in a way that seeks to 
undermine the competitive advantage of developing countries. The Union’s projection 
of norms externally is clearly intended to protect and safeguard European interests 
abroad. Brussels seeks to impose norms irrespective of the stage of development, 
historical background, political traditions, and social-cultural heritage or systems of 
other countries (see Jain and Pandey 2014). The Europeans come with their own foreign 
policy preferences, expecting Indians to conform to them or explain why they are not 
complying with them. The EU’s normative narrative is being increasingly contested and 
challenged by the emerging powers, including India, which are beginning to contribute 
to alternative, non-EU narratives. A strategic partnership, in fact, never implied an 
automatic normative convergence between partners. 
The Union’s strategic partners often criticize Brussels for its double standards. Indian 
stakeholders have wondered how the EU espousal of human rights and its promotion of 
democracy could be reconciled with the political expediency of hugging military rulers 
responsible for ousting democratically-elected rulers. Thus, Indians feel that they do not 
need any “ethical lessons” from a Europe which has “long coddled” military dictators 
in its neighbourhood (Tharoor 2007). India resents Europeans speaking from a high 
moral pedestal and often assuming a patronizing attitude: “Engage and we shall teach 
you how to do things.” Indians have “an allergy” against being lectured to. One of the 
great failings of the India-EU partnership has been the tendency of Europe “to preach” 
to India on matters like human rights which it considers quite competent to handle on 
its own (Tharoor 2012a).
There is a growing “normative disconnect” (Holslag 2010) between the EU and emerging 
powers. There is a basic contestation between the European Union and most of its 
strategic partners about the content, value and scope of norms, because developing 
countries have been marginalized both economically and politically by the West, which 
has dominated the process since the end of the Second World War. The EU, thus, engages 
in a kind of “regulatory imperialism” through “unilateral regulatory globalization” (see 
Bradford 2011). The EU’s unsuccessful attempt to impose a carbon tax on international 
airline flights was a reflection of its tendency to unilaterally impose its own standards 
on the rest of the world, seeking to impose unilaterally what it fails to achieve either 
multilaterally or bilaterally. On climate change, European states are generally perceived 
as pursuing an environmental agenda that is all about saving their commercial interests 
and not necessarily about saving the planet (Chaudhuri 2012).
In the post-Cold War era, India has emerged as a far more pragmatic power, more 
willing to serve its fundamental economic and trading interests and less engaged in 
sanctimonious moralizing. India deals with the EU in a strongly realist tradition and 
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is acutely sensitive about sovereignty and internal autonomy against intrusive human 
rights issues and remains wary about humanitarian intervention and the circumstances 
in which force may be used. A more confident India has become less vociferous in its 
opposition towards military intervention. However, in the absence of clear rules, it 
“prefers abstentions or neutrality to support” (Chaudhuri 2014: 14-15). For the most part, 
India has been a norm-taker rather than a norm-setter. It has largely pursued a reactive 
and defensive stance rather than a proactive one towards norms in order to safeguard its 
national interests and maintain a peaceful external environment to ensure development 
and growth. 
Security Dialogue
Since the 1990s, Brussels showed little interest in engaging in a frank and honest 
dialogue with India on terrorism or to confront Pakistan about its sponsorship of cross-
border terrorism. The European and Indian narratives, interpretations and analyses on 
key issues like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states 
have been at variance with one another. For instance, most Europeans have perceived 
terrorism as “a serious crime rather than an enemy to wage war on” (Argomaniz 2011: 
95). In contrast to the rather modest agenda on security and terrorism proposed by the 
European Commission (June 2004), enhanced technical cooperation in areas such as 
money laundering and a dialogue on document security, civil aviation and maritime 
security (European Commission 2004: para 2.1.4 of COM 2004), Indian proposals were 
much more ambitious.5 Apart from an annual security dialogue (since May 2006), there 
are four other security-related dialogues: counter-terrorism (between EEAS, Europol, 
Eurojust, and DG JUST and HOME and the MEA and specialized Indian agencies); 
counter-piracy, cyber-security and cyber crime, and non-proliferation and disarmament. 
At the EU level, Brussels coordinates things like aviation security and restricting 
access to materials for explosives. The only multinational agencies that exist at the EU 
level are Europol – the EU’s centralized police organization – and Eurojust, a judicial 
organization which brings together investigating judges and public prosecutors. Owing 
to its extremely limited competences in the security field, the Union is unable to bring 
many security deliverables to the strategic partnership. Even where it can meaningfully 
contribute to meeting India’s security concerns, the difficulties in reaching a consensus 
amongst an increasingly heterogenous EU-28 often preclude a meaningful response. 
For instance, after repeated requests, out of the 11 terrorist organizations banned by 
the EU in May 2002, three were of direct relevance to India. Brussels added another 
one in November 2005. However, with terrorist outfits changing their names rather 
frequently, Member States showed little enthusiasm in regularly updating the list owing 
to the extreme reluctance of EU Member States to get into a rather demanding, time-
5 The Foundation for National Security Policy examined India’s relationship with the United States, Rus-
sia, Japan, UK and China, on the basis of five parameters, viz. economics, politics, defence, technology 
and people-to-people, and rank them in order of importance. The EU also did not figure in the six coun-
tries (United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan) that the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses identified for its study on the basis of those which were most active in the fields of 
defence cooperation, economic cooperation and political-diplomatic cooperation.
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consuming, and permanent process of negotiation. 
None of the major Indian proposals made a decade ago have yet seen the light of day. An 
agreement with Europol has yet to be signed. Similarly, seven years after India’s request 
for an EU-India Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in Criminal Matters to provide the 
over-arching legal framework for cooperation, the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator 
acknowledged that there was no agreement among Member States on this proposal 
because it was “quite resource-intensive” (cited in Aiyar 2011). It has hit a “dead end” since 
the Commission’s legal directorate in charge of the dossier has come to the conclusion 
that “the likely benefits for the EU would not be worth the arduous, multiannual effort 
to try to integrate the existing patchwork of treaties between India and individual EU 
member states into one superseding agreement” (Muenchow-Pohl 2012: 33).
The lack of a more meaningful security dialogue is largely because the security milieus 
of the Union and India are completely different. Given the mismatch of security context, 
concerns and goals, most EU Member States share neither the same urgency nor the same 
interest in cooperating with India. Since a multinational entity like the Union has neither 
the necessary assets nor the competences of Member States, most practical cooperation 
in terms of surveillance technology, military equipment, intelligence sharing, etc. has 
been on a bilateral, rather than a multilateral, basis. For instance, one of most fruitful 
security dialogues was held under the French Presidency in the immediate aftermath 
of the Mumbai terror attack (November 2008), which led to enhanced cooperation in 
diverse areas with key Member States. 
The Union is neither perceived as a major factor of consequence in South Asia nor is 
it considered critical to the security discourses within the region. India does not really 
expect Europe to contribute much to its persistent migraine regarding Pakistan. India, 
according to a Wikileaks cable, has in the early 2000s tended to regard the EU as “naïve, 
overly pro-active, and short-sighted, particularly when it comes to developments in South 
Asia” (Wikileaks 2004). New Delhi has been annoyed with the Union’s approach towards 
the region, describing it as “too obvious, shabby, shortsighted and full of contradictions” 
and possessing “a tendency to go overboard” (Wikileaks 2004). Dealing with the Maoist 
insurgency in Nepal is still the only instance in recent years of the short-lived EU-India 
cooperation on South Asian security issues. India has not been responsive to attempts 
by Brussels to bring developments in Sri Lanka as part of the annual security dialogue.
Europeans do not seem to be overly concerned about the potential security implications 
of a rising and more assertive China, its military modernization and its rising defence 
expenditure. This is partly because Asian issues and nations are too distant to directly 
impinge on its own security, partly because the EU is not militarily present in East Asia, 
and unlike the United States, does not play the role of an external balancer in Asia. Asian 
nations continue to have reservations about the European Union’s Asian capabilities 
and credentials. For instance, for the second time, the EU’s request for membership 
of the East Asian Summit has been declined. Moreover, while Europeans aspire to a 
multipolar world, they seem to endorse Chinese views of a unipolar Asia. India, on the 
other hand, is keen that a strong EU plays a larger and more active role in Asia and works 
towards promoting a more equitable, stable balance of power in Asia. Security is and will 
continue to remain a marginal area for EU-India cooperation because the EU adds “very 
little value” to India’s efforts to overcome its principal security challenges (Tharoor 2012: 
245). The Union is virtually irrelevant in the immediate priority areas of strategic interest 
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to India, viz. its own neighbourhood, the Gulf region, the United States and China, as 
well as major global security issues like nuclear proliferation, civil conflict and terrorism. 
India and the EU have not yet built a real structure for real discussions on security issues. 
Despite a common desire to have greater dialogue on conceptual and operational 
aspects of peacekeeping operations and several Track II efforts, there continue to be 
difficulties in enhancing cooperation on peacekeeping operations. Whereas the EU 
seeks to co-opt third countries in Common Security and Defence Policy missions, India 
is steadfast that it will only participate in UN-mandated and UN-led missions. The lack 
of a common strategic culture would therefore continue to impede more meaningful 
strategic cooperation between the EU and India. 
Since December 2011, a working relationship has been established between the EU 
naval operation, ATLANTA, deployed in the Gulf of Aden to combat Somalian piracy, 
and an Indian naval patrol deployed there, which, like other national patrols in the area, 
is primarily interested in protecting commercial ships flying its own flag. Not much 
attention has so far been given to other issues like coordinated action in mutual legal 
assistance in the investigation and persecution of captured pirates, capacity-building 
of Indian Ocean regional navies, and the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia 
without which maritime security in the region would continue to be fragile. Future areas 
of cooperation can include support for capacity-building of small Indian Ocean region 
navies, but a major challenge continues to be interoperability. Both have recently begun 
to show greater interest in forging closer cooperation in non-traditional security. The 
two sides could consider the establishment of a Joint Counter-Terrorism Technology 
Development Initiative.
 
Challenge of concluding the BITA
A major challenge in the India-EU strategic partnership is to conclude the Bilateral Trade 
and Investment Agreement (BITA). After sixteen rounds and several missed deadlines 
since negotiations first began in June 2007 encompassing trade in goods, trade in services, 
investment, intellectual property rights, competition, trade facilitation, government 
procurement, and dispute settlement, an agreement has so far proved to be elusive. For 
Brussels, the FTA with India is narrower and shallower than what it usually seeks. For 
India, however, it is a far more comprehensive one than the ones it has negotiated so far. 
Though most of the issues like pharmaceuticals have largely been resolved, some of the 
most difficult and sensitive issues have been left till the very end. The Eurozone crisis 
has reinforced reluctance to make further concessions. Disagreements still persist over 
key European demands relating to the reduction of duties on automobiles and wines 
and spirits, as well as government procurement. Key Indian demands include mobility 
of skilled Indian professionals and data secure status. 
Like all trade negotiations, the on-going negotiations for an FTA are contentious, but 
both feel that they will be better off with an agreement than without one. The FTA will set 
the parameters of the trading relationship for the next decades and would undoubtedly 
be the most significant deliverable of the India-EU strategic partnership. Given the 
massive mandate of the National Democratic Alliance led by the Bharatiya Janata Party 
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(BJP) in the May 2004 elections, some issues like an increase in the FDI limit in insurance 
should be possible. However, red lines still persist on a few contentious issues. The two 
sides can choose to do the doable in keeping with the incremental approach suggested 
by India and other issues can be included at a later stage. 
Overcoming	the	information	deficit
Despite growing awareness and information about the European Union after the 
launch of the strategic partnership, there continues to be a wide gap between peoples 
as a result of mutual indifference and neglect. The strongest clichés about Europe still 
endure. There is “a permanent lack of mutual knowledge,” with Europe still “marginal 
in the Indian collective memory” (Goddeeris 2011: 7). The EU “hardly figures on the 
Indian mental map beyond the small circles of those who have to deal with it directly” 
(Muenchow-Pohl 2012: 34).
Opinions of the Indian elite have tended to be conditioned by dispatches in Indian 
newspapers which have originated in or were transmitted by Western wire agencies. 
Continued reliance on the Anglo-Saxon media has tended to reinforce stereotypical 
clichés about Europe. The baggage of images of the EU still persists. Images of the 
Union as a global economic actor with a fragmented foreign policy, the predominance of 
economic issues in India-EU relations, etc. remains deeply anchored in Indian perceptions 
of the EU. It had been invisible as a development aid actor. The EU is not perceived as a 
coherent foreign policy actor largely because of its “capabilities-expectations” gap (Hill 
1993). The European Union may have a lot of strategies and create ever newer policy 
areas, but it has so far not been able to develop a strategic culture. It does not attach 
much credence to the Union’s soft power; soft power to Indians means no power. The 
Eurozone crisis has tended to reinforce the already negative perceptions of a Europe 
in relative decline (see Jain 2014). The EU is grossly under-reported, with most news 
items being event-driven, the majority being on trade and economic issues, with an 
imperative India angle. Much of the internal wrangling or the nitty-gritty of internal 
EU developments is rarely reported except the Eurozone crisis, which has had a steady 
stream of articles in the Indian media.
Europe has been a key focus of New Delhi’s recent efforts to foster greater awareness 
about contemporary India. For instance, it has established 35 India Chairs (about a third 
of 108 worldwide) in 16 EU Member States, many of which focus on contemporary India. 
But much more needs to be done to enhance knowledge about the emerging powers 
amongst younger generations in Europe. Much further mutual learning is required for 
perceptions to gradually change. 
Challenge of visibility
Visibility continues to be a challenge for both India and the European Union. There is a 
communication gap in how the EU communicates and explains itself to a major Asian 
country. There is also a big gap between self-perceptions of the European reality and 
how ‘Outsiders’ perceive it. A more conscious effort needs to be made to overcome 
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perceptional differences. It is essential to explore innovative ways for how the EU can 
better target and synergize its media, communication and public diplomacy strategies 
with strategic partners like India in order to enhance its visibility and overcome stereotypes 
and misperceptions (Jain and Pandey 2010). Both India and Europe have to make a 
conscious effort to overcome perceptional differences, since misperceptions constrain 
greater mutual cooperation and dialogue. Since perceptions do matter in cementing 
or retarding ties, EU policy-makers must address this concern more effectively if they 
seek to become a player of greater consequence in Asia (Jain and Pandey 2012; Jain and 
Pandey 2014a). India confronts similar challenges of improving its image and visibility 
in the EU. 
7. Conclusion
Strategic partnerships are based on long-term engagement, which can gradually lead 
to improved understanding and cooperation. They have facilitated more focused, 
structured sectoral dialogues, but they usually lead to bland statements characterized 
by a high degree of rhetorical convergence. One should not, therefore, overrate the 
instrument of strategic partnerships because they were never meant to promise more 
than they could deliver.
Both EU and Indian officials find each other to be extremely difficult and equally frustrating. 
Both India and the European Union, according to an ambassador of a prominent 
Member State, have “a tendency to look to the most powerful poles in international 
relations rather than towards each other, and each spends more time deploring the 
shortcomings of the other than building the foundations of future partnership” (cited 
in Malone 2012: 247).
Even though both New Delhi and Brussels are struggling to find a constructive, yet 
realistic approach to building a strategic partnership, there is certainly more contact 
and content than in the past. Greater engagement with the EU has facilitated greater 
understanding of each other’s perspectives towards bilateral, regional and global issues. 
But the willingness to discuss and engage has not necessarily been accompanied by 
a mindset change about each other. With EU development assistance to India having 
ceased in 2014, the traditional prism of looking at New Delhi as an aid recipient has 
certainly come to an end. The conclusion of the Bilateral Investment and Trade agreement 
in the near future can take the relationship to a new height, as it will set the parameters 
of the India-EU trading relationship for the coming decades and contribute significantly 
to building greater stakes in the relationship in both entities.
One basic reason has been the lack of an economic underpinning of the relationship, 
which is one-sixth that of China.6 Until the 1980s, Continental Europeans treated India 
as the diplomatic property of the United Kingdom, as key EU Member States had few 
material interests or stakes in the region. Since then, many of the historical and historical 
bonds and terms which traditionally linked India with Britain, including the “Oxbridge” 
6 For Indian perceptions of EU-China relations, see Jain 2009.
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legacy, have considerably withered away with time. It has become a more level playing 
field, and unlike the past, major Member States like France and Germany no longer 
defer to the UK for expertise or special intuition regarding the region. They have not 
only forged meaningful strategic partnerships with India but have nurtured extensive 
links across the socio-political spectrum and civil society. As before, India still has limited 
interaction with Continental Europe; this is partly due to the lack of a significant diaspora 
on the Continent and also explains the lack of relations with Continental Europe. 
India and the European Union have limited potential and complementarity in geopolitical 
terms. The foreign policy and security dimensions of the strategic partnership are at a 
very nascent stage largely because for Indian elites the EU displays a lack of geopolitical 
coherence and has not yet shown signs of acting as a credible power (Lisbonne-de 
Vergeron 2006: 5). The Union confronts a continuous challenge to unambiguously 
demonstrate the value addition it can provide to the partnership beyond trade. Like 
many of the EU’s other strategic partners, India prefers to deal directly with Member 
States instead of the over-institutionalized and over-bureaucratized institutions of the 
EU. EU Member States demonstrate a continued reluctance to act collectively and have 
a marked preference for individualism in dealing with strategic partners. It is therefore 
hard for Indians “to discount the vigorous competition displayed by leading European 
countries with each other in vying for Indian favour (mainly in the economic sphere), 
and the lack of priority these same EU countries accord the EU and its machinery when 
dealing with India bilaterally” (Malone 2012: 16). Officials from some of the governments 
of the largest European states frequently urge New Delhi “to support their national 
policies – so they could undermine the policy being pushed by Brussels” (Chaudhuri 
2014: 2). The “choice for low-profile leaders” of principal EU institutions (Tharoor 2012: 
246) has also been a contributory factor for the Indian preference for bilateralism. 
India has perhaps been too dismissive of the promise and potential of the European 
Union as a foreign policy actor in a multipolar world. Indian policy-makers also need 
to overcome their inherent discomfort in dealing with a complex, supranational and 
postmodern entity like the European Union. New Delhi has welcomed the changes 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, including an end to the irritating presidencies of 
smaller Member States, but more efforts need to be made at understanding the nuances 
of the workings of EU institutions. There is an imperative need to intensify interaction 
and consultations with the European Parliament given its growing importance in the 
EU institutional architecture. To most Indians, postmodern Europe seems to be a lonely 
power in what is basically a Westphalian world with pre-modern and modern States. 
Postmodernism is not only “alien but baffling for the Indian system” (Chaudhuri, 2011). 
To Indian policy-makers, the postmodern vocabulary and discourse does not persuade 
practitioners to make decisions on discourse, but on the basis of choices and risks in 
objective reality (Menon 2013).
Despite shared values, the lack of shared interests on a number of issues will continue 
to limit cooperation. India and the EU have many common interests, but transforming 
them into coordinated policies has been rather elusive. Both sides wish to take the 
relationship forward. However, in the ultimate analysis, it is not really whether the Union 
is postmodernist and India modernist, the former neo-realist and India realist. It is 
really about whether the two can display a similarity of analysis and mutual confidence 
regarding shared interests to facilitate greater cooperation. 
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Brussels and the Member States complain that they encounter problems of capacity, 
and resources of India’s Ministry of External Affairs cite the small size of its diplomatic 
service – similar to the island state of Singapore. The EU has also been unhappy that 
it still does not have direct access to the Foreign Secretary (unlike France, the UK and 
Germany), but only to the Secretary (West) whose remit includes, among others, the rest 
of Europe, both East and West.
A worsening demographic profile with a graying population is compelling the European 
Union to address the problems and opportunities of in-sourcing highly skilled 
immigrants or outsourcing services. Since skilled immigrants seek better location and 
conditions, European countries are increasingly concluding social security agreements 
with India. There is considerable potential for India and Europe to move increasingly 
towards partnership in cutting-edge technologies in a manner which combines 
India’s strengths with European capabilities. India’s participation in the International 
Thermonuclear Reactor Project (ITER) and the Galileo satellite projects was facilitated by 
the EU. A more substantive economic, technological and cultural interaction between 
India and Europe has to necessarily underpin the political relationship. There is a 
need to widen and deepen civil society dialogue and sustain it beyond being largely 
government-driven. There is an imperative need to develop a more robust framework of 
educational exchanges and elite interaction in order to better comprehend differences 
and work towards achieving common goals. It is essential to encourage Indian elites 
and students to study in Europe in larger numbers, especially as India’s new generation 
has a societal bias and looks mostly towards the United States. It is also helpful to foster 
greater research on contemporary India at universities and think-tanks which have been 
fixated on China for too long. Growing trade and the rise of Indian multinationals is 
creating greater constituencies in Europe, which will gradually contribute to building 
better foundations of the India-EU strategic partnership. 
Europeans have to revise their mental maps about the growing profile of emerging 
powers and the gradual shift of economic power to the East. This may not happen soon, 
as old habits die hard – especially as Europeans have for centuries been accustomed to 
beget influence, and at one point in time, whether your voice was heard at all depended 
on Europe. With the rise of the Rest, things are not quite what they seemed to be. 
Europeans will have to change their continuing narrative that they can continue as before 
without adapting. Europe should recognize that it has to listen more and lecture less, 
for very often most Indians tend to regard Europe as being intrusive and preachy. The 
new European narrative needs to be more open, inclusive and accommodating. There 
has to be a real dialogue, not a dialogue amongst the deaf (not talking at each other, 
but to each other). Enduring cooperation requires shared interests not merely at the 
conceptual level, but in operational terms as well. Very often, it is not merely a question 
of priorities, but the lack of understanding which results in the lack of cooperation. 
With its focus on development and good governance, there are high expectations that 
the new government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi will overcome political 
drift and policy paralysis and steer the country towards accelerated reforms and more 
sustainable economic growth. India is on the verge of an unprecedented economic 
resurgence under a decisive leadership. To that end, Europe offers immense promise 
and potential as an invaluable development partner.
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